Is Muslim minority integration in Europe slowing down?

Part 1. The case of France

Back in 2009, a video titled “Muslim Demographics” was posted on YouTube. It predicted a dramatic demographic and cultural change in Western Europe due to immigration from Muslim-majority countries and differences in fertility rates. Now, 15 years later, we can analyze how those fears correspond with reality.

Among other claims, the video suggested that the Muslim population in France would reach 20% by 2027. However, as we approach 2027, no recent surveys, including Eurobarometer (2019), INSEE (2023a), or Eurobarometer (2023), indicate that the Muslim population in France is significantly above 10%. Furthermore, the Pew Research Center now predicts that even by 2050, the Muslim population in France will be around 10.9% (Pew Research Center, 2022).

Although the 20% projection was obviously unrealistic to demographers, it was not surprising to the general public. After all, in popular imagination the share of Muslims in France is already above 20%. For instance, a decade ago, French respondents estimated that the Muslim population in their country was at 31% (Ipsos, 2014).

Sources of inflated expectations

Ethnic origin vs religion

While there are many reasons for overinflated estimates of religious minority population sizes, several key factors contribute to this overestimation. First of all, any projections like that vastly underestimate intergenerational attrition of religious affiliation and simply assume that all immigrants from Muslim-majority countries and their descendants are Muslim and are going to remain Muslim. However, in the particular case of France, such an assumption doesn’t even remotely reflect reality. For example, North Africa is the most common region of origin for French Muslims. However, only 64% of the descendants of immigrants from Algeria and 65% of descendants of immigrants from Morocco and Tunisia currently identify as Muslim (INSEE, 2023b, Figure 2). Moreover, the survey also found that religiosity declines over time even among those who remain Muslim (INSEE, 2023b, Figure 4).

Fertility rates

Unrealistically high estimated birth rates among the descendants of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries is another source of unrealistic projections. However, claims about persistent significant differences in fertility rates between residents with roots in Muslim-majority countries and other residents of France has been proven to be false.  For example, while fertility rates are somewhat higher among immigrants from North African countries, these rates for daughters of North African migrants fully converge with those of French women without an immigrant background (INSEE, 2023c).

Source: Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés. Édition 2023. Fécondité (INSEE 2023c)

Sources of fears

Another interesting question is: why have the fears about Muslim population growth in Europe become so popular?

Various studies demonstrate that respondents across the world prioritize the adoption of values and social norms (along with mastery of the dominant national language) as key conditions for accepting newcomers as full members of society (Pew Research Center, 2017).

Such attitudes are not irrational. A large and growing share of the population living in ethnically isolated communities and not adhering to dominant values can theoretically lead to an erosion of prevalent social norms and institutions cherished by the host population. Some go as far as to expect that prevalent social norms and values can be supplanted by those prevalent in immigrants’ countries of origin. However, such a scenario is extremely unlikely, as the pressure to conform to dominant social norms in any human group is usually very strong and involves a variety of mechanisms (Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Henrich, 2016). Nevertheless, it would be interesting to look at actual data regarding the social integration of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries and their children.

First of all, let’s look at various indicators of social isolation.

Residential Segregation

French Census data demonstrate a lack of isolation among resident foreigners coming from Muslim-majority countries. For example, an average Tunisian in France resides in neighborhoods that, on average, include 2.3% Tunisian co-residents. Similarly, for Algerians, this share is 5.0%; for Moroccans, it’s 5.1%; and for Turks, 3.7% (Pan Ke Shon and Verdugo, 2015). These numbers hardly indicate total social exclusion or ethnic ghettoization.

Interethnic Marriage

Moreover, immigrants and descendants of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries are not just living in the same neighborhoods as people of other origins; they are living in the same households. The share of interethnic marriages among children of Maghrebi immigrants in France has increased from less than a quarter

in 1992 (Tribalat, 1995; Lucassen and Laarman, 2009) to 57% in 2020 (INSEE, 2022). Crucially, we are not only seeing a gradually rising prevalence of interethnic marriage as immigrants from Muslim-majority countries and their descendants are gradually integrating into the host societies, but we are observing accelerated integration, as current children of immigrants (second-generation immigrants) demonstrate significantly higher exogamy rates than second-generation immigrants from the same countries several decades ago. Interestingly, such an acceleration of assimilation and integration of immigrants and their descendants is not unique to France and is actually quite common (as I am going to describe in one of my future posts).

Interethnic and interfaith marriages are now normal in France, and opposition to them is quite low among both Muslim and non-Muslim residents. In 2023, 70% of French residents are totally comfortable (Eurobarometer, 2023) with a love relationship of their child (or potential child) with a person of Muslim origin (including almost 85% among people younger than 35). For comparison, in 2015, the percentage of those totally comfortable stood at 62%, and only 53% among those born before 1960 (Eurobarometer, 2015).

Similarly, the same Eurobarometer surveys from 2019 and 2023 indicate that 71% of French Muslims are totally comfortable with the love relationship of their child with a Christian partner (while only 14% are uncomfortable).

Language adoption

Language adoption is a key driver of social integration, and French respondents selected it as the most important condition that immigrants need to fulfill to be accepted as full members of society (Pew Research Center, 2017). Recent data on language usage and proficiency confirm the trend towards fast-paced integration and assimilation. For example, only 6% of adult children of immigrants from North Africa declare that they are able to read, speak, write, and understand the language of their parents very well (INSEE, 2023a). These numbers are somewhat higher when it comes to the ability to at least speak and understand the ancestral language very well (34% for descendants of immigrants from Algeria and 39% for those from Morocco and Tunisia). Crucially, 95% of adult second-generation immigrants from Algeria and 92% from Tunisia and Morocco declare that their parents used French when speaking to them during their childhood (INSEE, 2023a). Moreover, close to 40% of adult descendants of immigrants from those origins communicated with their parents exclusively in French (as their parents never used Arabic or Berber when speaking to them).

Social norms and values

Social norms regarding LGBT rights can serve as a good indicator of the gradual adoption of mainstream society values. The gap in attitudes towards homosexuality in France and in Muslim-majority countries is extremely large (Pew Research Center, 2013a; Pew Research Center, 2013b). If we assume a lack of social integration, we might expect that overwhelmingly negative attitudes towards any form of gay rights would be preserved by Muslim immigrants and their descendants. Some authors even argue that we should expect a turn against gay rights as a result of mass migration (e.g., Murray, 2017).

However, popular stereotypes do not reflect reality. Eurobarometer surveys from 2019 to 2023 demonstrate that only 33% of French Muslims oppose gay marriage (Eurobarometer, 2019; Eurobarometer, 2023). Other recent surveys follow the same pattern. European Social Surveys from 2016 to 2020 also show high and rising support for gay rights among French Muslims. Only 44% among them oppose adoption by gay and lesbian couples. Importantly, the opposition declines to 31% among Muslims born in France (ESS Data Portal, 2023).

Moreover, as mentioned above, many immigrants from Muslim-majority countries and especially their descendants no longer identify as Muslims. Therefore, we underestimate the speed of convergence in values between them and other members of French society when we pay attention only to those members of the group who retain the faith of their ancestors (country of origin).

When we consider all immigrants and descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb in France (irrespective of their current religion), we see that opposition to gay adoption is only 35%. Among children of immigrants from the Maghreb (who were born in France), only 24% oppose gay adoption. The opposition among French adults without an immigrant background stands at 23%.

Source: European Social Surveys 2016-2020 (ESS Data Portal 2023)

Conclusions

As the evidence presented above indicates, Great Replacement-style fearmongering is not just wrong regarding Muslim population size, but strangely assumes that the values, norms, and beliefs of immigrants are immovable and are getting transmitted to their descendants without any changes. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the values and norms held by French residents originating from Muslim-majority countries are very malleable and are becoming increasingly similar to those of French citizens without an immigrant background.

Moreover, concerns regarding immigrant integration, and specifically regarding the speed of integration and/or assimilation of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries, are overblown. To the contrary, various key indicators, like the prevalence of intermarriage, show that the pace of immigrant integration in France is accelerating.

References

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YouTube, 2009. Muslim Demographics. Available at: